Internet message boards are inherently a world of cheap talk due to the anonymity of message authors. This paper investigates whether a pecuniary reputation system influences the adverse selection problem endemic to message boards. First, we find evidence that authors with high reputation scores are less likely to voluntarily offer a buy-hold-sell sentiment in a particular message. Second, we find that authors with no reputation at stake tend to be more bearish with their sentiment but, after controlling for selection, authors with more reputation at stake tend to be bullish in their sentiment. Third, we find that high-reputation authors tend to offer more accurate sentiments on the day their message was posted, which suggests day-trading behavior by authors, but that that higher-reputation authors are no more accurate than others after the day of posting. Our results suggest that reputation, coupled with a small pecuniary reward system, can materially influence the adverse selection problem in a world of cheap talk.
Introduction
The Internet has dramatically altered the way information is disseminated. For example, the website ratemyprofessor.com allows students to offer opinions and ratings of professors, often to the chagrin or dismay of those being reviewed. Other websites allow individuals to offer opinions about all forms of consumer products and services. These websites are characterized by economies of scale that make it possible for information posted by one person in one place to be accessed by people located in far-flung areas. However, opinionbased websites suffer from adverse selection problems because the opinions offered are mostoften unsolicited and anonymous. Anonymity provides a level of security behind which an individual can offer factually incorrect opinions and information with seeming impunity.
Notwithstanding this problem, opinion-based internet web-sites continue to persist. How can the adverse selection problem be overcome in these contexts? One approach is to provide a moderator to screen opinions and comments for obviously misleading or inappropriate content. However, this approach requires considerable resources and introduces a potential moral hazard problem if the moderator has an agenda at odds with end-users. 1 An alternative is to allow those who consume the information to identify and reward authors for quality information. Reputation systems have been implemented in a wide range of on-line applications, including auction sites such as eBay.com and reseller sites such as Amazon.com.
However, the vast majority of reputation systems do not directly entail a pecuniary reward;
rather, high reputation only provides indirect benefits, perhaps through higher closing prices in auctions or more frequent sales by resellers. 4 This paper investigates a financial message board on which authors can voluntarily offer a buy-hold-sell sentiment (hereafter sentiment) that accompanies their posted message.
Offering a buy-hold-sell sentiment on an Internet message board would seem a quintessential form of -cheap talk.‖ However, the message board we investigate has two aspects that might mitigate the adverse selection problem. First, readers can add an author to their -watch list,‖ after which all messages by that author are highlighted to the reader. We interpret the number of watch lists to which an author has been added as a non-monetary reputation measure. As the message board indicates the number of watch lists to which each author belongs, this simple index of popularity might alter the frequency and quality of sentiments provided by the author.
A second attribute is that readers can purchase (through Paypal or a personal credit/debit card) credits with which to reward authors. Accumulated credits can be used by authors to reward other authors or to purchase goods and services from the message board (these electronic credits cannot be withdrawn or converted to real money). Each author's aggregated reward is also public information and might mitigate the adverse selection problem by changing the incentives to offer misleading or inaccurate information. We investigate whether such a reward system sufficiently alters incentives to encourage more truthfulness in an otherwise anonymous setting.
Our empirical model is guided by the literature investigating the buy-hold-sell sentiments offered by professional stock analysts. We relate any sentiment offered on a particular message to characteristics of the author at the time the message was posted, characteristics of the firm to which the message refers, and characteristics of the message itself. We address the 5 obvious problem of sample selection by allowing the reputation of the author to influence whether a sentiment is offered.
The empirical analysis addresses three questions. First, does reputation influence the probability that an author offers a buy-hold-sell sentiment? Second, does reputation influence an author's buy-hold-sell sentiment, given that she offers a sentiment? Third, does reputation correlate with more accurate sentiment, given that a sentiment is offered?
The Literature of Online Message Boards
This paper draws together two distinct strands of literature. The first focuses on the impact of message board activity on asset prices, that is, whether explicit or implicit buy-hold-sell sentiments conveyed through messages posted on various internet sites have any statistical relationship with asset price movements. The second strand of literature focuses on explaining the patterns of explicit buy-hold-sentiments by stock analysts and others, and whether the accuracy of sentiment is related to the reputation of the analyst.
Focusing on the first strand, online message boards are often filled with strong opinions and commentary. However, these opinions are thought to convey little useful information to investors primarily because of the anonymity of the authors and the extremely small amount of constructive information included in any particular message (Sabherwal, Sarkar and Zhang, 2008) . Furthermore, unlike professional journalism articles or financial reports, posted messages are often short and written in an informal, dialogue-like format (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2001) . Thus it would seem unlikely that the material content of messages posted on-line would have any relationship with the prices of the assets to which the messages refer.
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However, several studies, such as Tumarkin and Whitelaw (2001) , Tumarkin (2002) , Antweiler and Frank (2004) , Das and Chen (2007) , Gu, et al. (2007) , and Koski, et al. (2007) , provide evidence that the general aggregate sentiment offered on Internet message boards is contemporaneously correlated with short-term abnormal returns, trading volume, and price volatility. However, a limitation of these studies is that often the buy-hold-sell sentiment of a message's author is not explicitly stated, either through statements in the body of the message or through an independent buy-hold-sell sentiment indicator.
Because not all message boards provide a separate buy-hold-sell sentiment indicator, several studies focus only on messages that explicitly indicate a buy-hold-sell sentiment in the body of the message, treating messages that do not reveal explicit sentiment as noise (see, for example, Tumarkin and Whitelaw, 2001, and Gu, et al., 2007) . One downside to this approach is that potentially valuable information is discarded from the analysis.
In response, other researchers have developed techniques which utilize all messages, regardless of whether sentiment was offered, so to retain potentially useful information. One approach is to analyze the words included in the body of the message, gauge whether the message is relatively positive or negative, and generate a -perceived sentiment‖ score (for example, Antweiler and Frank, 2004 , and Das and Chen, 2003 . While this approach allows all messages to contribute to a proxy for consensus sentiment it is clearly a second-best approach; the algorithm used to detect perceived sentiment might be mistaken.
When analyzing a message board with a separate buy-hold-sell sentiment indicator these issues are avoided.
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A second strand of literature related to the current study focuses on how sentiment is related to various aspects of the analyst, the firm involved, and other macro-level variables.
Several suggest that stock analysts are generally overly optimistic when providing stock recommendations, partly because of conflicts of interest; see Jegadeesh, et al. (2004 ), Carleton, et al. (1998 ), Michaely and Womack (1999 , Barber, et al. (2004), and Jackson (2005) . Nonetheless, Stickel (1992) , Park and Stice (2000) , and Fang and Yasuda (2005) show that high-reputation stock analysts, so-called All-star analysts, have greater influence on stock prices and are more accurate in earnings forecasts than those with low or no reputation. Recently, Jackson (2005) found that high reputation analysts generate more trades for their brokerage firms and more accurate analysts, in turn, have higher reputations.
A related strand of literature looks at the sentiment of those who post to message boards. Antweiler and Frank (2004) , Tumarkin and Whitelaw (2001) , Tumarkin (2002) , Sabherwal, Sarkar and Zhang (2008) and Zhang and Swanson (2009) , all show that online traders are consistently bullish or buy-side biased and that their aggregated sentiments can be interpreted as a bullishness index.
Whether on-line reputation systems offer useful information to users is an empirical question. The majority of the literature focusing on this area uses data from on-line auction sites to test for whether better seller reputation corresponds with higher closing prices, less time on market, and a greater probability of a successful auction. Three representative analyses, each of which focus on the reputation system used by the on-line auction site eBay, include Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) Houser and Wooders (2006) and Depken and Gregorius (2010) . These studies find that seller reputation has a positive correlation with the 8 odds of a successful auction and, given a successful auction, with closing prices of various products.
Testable Hypotheses
The popular stock message board Thelion.com provides a reputation system with which readers can not only provide a reputation score for each message author but the reputation score itself can be used for pecuniary gain. This reputation system mitigates the incentive for authors to post under different usernames, might reduce the incentive to -pump and dump‖ particular stocks, and might increase the incentives to offer accurate information. However, the questions addressed here is how the reader-financed reputation system influences the probability that an author will offer a buy-hold-sell sentiment on a given post, whether reputation influences the type of sentiment offered, and whether reputation correlates with the accuracy of any sentiment offered.
A post to the message board under consideration is comprised of a message title, a message body, comprised of text and possibly links to other sites on the Internet, an optionally provided buy-hold-sell sentiment, an identifier as to which stock or security the author is referring, the author's username, the number of watch lists to which the author's name has been added, the aggregate level of reputation credits the author has received up to the time the message was posted, the time of the post, and whether the post is a reply to another post in a thread. Notwithstanding the influence of author reputation on offering a buy-hold-sell sentiment, there are potentially other influences on the net marginal benefit of voluntarily offering sentiment. An author might be more likely to offer sentiment when confident of being correct and when there is a high probability that readers will notice the message, and hopefully reward the author. The more -watch lists‖ to which the author has been added, whether the post is a reply to a previous post, whether the post was created while the market was open, and the length of the message in characters are used to proxy for exposure. It is anticipated that messages with greater exposure have a higher probability of being associated with a voluntarily offered sentiment, after controlling for author reputation.
Therefore, the second (joint) null hypothesis tested is formalized as: According to Antweiler and Frank (2004) , sentiment is often positively correlated with current-day stock returns but negatively correlated with next-day stock returns. An author's reputation score, at the time they post a message, reflects the accumulated total of positive -votes‖ on the part of readers throughout the author's posting history. If we had access to the entire history of each author's postings it would be possible to test whether authors are rewarded for offering -accurate‖ sentiments over time. Unfortunately, this is not possible with the available data. We can, however, test whether an author's reputation at the time a message is posted influences the accuracy of any sentiment offered. DeMarzo, et al. (2003) and Antweiler and Frank (2004) posit that traders post about a particular stock only when they have a position in that stock and thus any sentiment offered is influenced by their stake in the stock. It has been documented that 99% of small investors 11 hold long positions and generally do not sell short because of the high costs and risks entailed in short selling (Odean, 1999) . 3 As a small trader is less likely to hold a short position, and to the extent that posters -put their mouth where their money is, the sentiment disclosed by authors should be consistent with their actual positions. If the majority of authors take a buyand-hold strategy and these authors are unlikely to provide a sentiment in conflict with their own interest, we would expect nearly homogenous sentiment among all authors regardless of their reputation score, that is, no statistically meaningful relationship between author reputation and sentiment accuracy.
On the other hand, there are two plausible alternatives to the null hypothesis of no relationship between sentiment accuracy and author reputation. One possibility is that authors seek to continually improve their reputation, in which case we would expect a positive and linear correlation between reputation and sentiment accuracy, at least in the short-run.
Another possibility is that authors engage in reputation accumulation and depreciation, in which case we would expect a concave relationship between reputation and sentiment accuracy; reputation and sentiment accuracy are positively related to each other up to some point, after which accuracy is negatively related to reputation.
We test for a relationship between sentiment accuracy, author reputation, message characteristics, and firm characteristics by estimating a series of probit models in which the dependent variables are indicators for whether sentiment qualitatively corresponds with current-day and inter-day abnormal stock returns. The hypotheses are formalized as follows: 
The Data
Using data gathered from essentially anonymous on-line message boards is fraught with a number of potentially debilitating problems. The first is accurately identifying the author of each message. Because authors can register under a number of different usernames, many researchers treat each username as a different individual even if this is not true (see Antweiler and Frank, 2004, and SEC, 2006) .
Thelion.com mitigates the incentive to register multiple usernames through its reputation system, which in turn reduces the potential for misappropriation of messages across different authors. First, Thelion.com publicizes the number of readers who have put a particular author on their watch list (although it does not report the number of -ignore‖ lists). Second, each newly registered user starts with zero reputation points and can purchase credits at a price of five cents each with which to reward other authors. 4 The author's aggregate number of credits is displayed next to the author's username in each message. 4 A reader can reward an author between one to three credits. The awarder's account is deducted the credits awarded to the author plus a -commission‖ of two credits, which removes the incentive to use different accounts and engage in self-donation. For instance, if awarding one credit to an author, the awarder's account is deducted three credits, the equivalent of fifteen cents, and the author's aggregate credits increases by one. In addition, the author also receives one credit of electronic money which can be used to award other authors (at the same two-
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The unique structure of the reputation system of Thelion.com reduces the probability that forum participants abuse electronic money or register multiple accounts to self donate in order to boost their reward points. If posts written by authors with more aggregate credits are more likely to be read, and if registering multiple accounts would reduce the accumulated reputation for any particular account, then authors have little incentive to register multiple usernames as the reputation of any particular username would be diluted.
Each message posted at Thelion!WallStreetPit from July 18, 2005 to July 18, 2006 was harvested, including the body of the message, when it was posted, by whom it was posted, the total accumulated reputation points attributed to the author, the total number of messages posted by the author, and what firm the message referred to. These data were matched with corresponding financial data from CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices), CompuStat, CapitalIQ and Yahoo! Finance. Since this study focuses on the impact of reputation on the frequency and accuracy of sentiment, messages not associated with a specific stock symbol were dropped from the sample. 5 We also removed messages posted during weekends and holidays and messages concerning stocks that traded less than $5 or sold over the counter.
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To determine whether high-reputation users behave different than low-reputation users in offering sentiment, we measure author reputation in two ways. First, the average reputation per message for each author is calculated on a rolling basis, that is, our measure of reputation changes with the number of posts by a particular author. Measuring reputation using the average credits per message penalizes authors who -shot-gun‖ or post a large number of credit cost) or for online services (e.g. Thelion.com provides an all-in-one service to search message boards for a specific stock). 5 Each message can only specify one stock symbol, displayed with the message's title on the forum webpage. 6 Stocks priced below five dollars cannot be sold short. Excluding stocks priced less than five dollars allows us to include -short sell‖ sentiments.
14 potentially contradictory messages in hopes of increasing their aggregate reputation. We also measure reputation in relative terms by splitting the sample of authors into reputation quintiles; using each author's aggregate reputation at the end of each day.
The descriptive statistics of our sample are reported in Table 1 . The sample is comprised of 48,644 different messages, of which 8,704 (23%) were associated with a voluntarily offered buy-hold-sell sentiment. Approximately 5% of all messages were posted by an author with zero reputation. For the remaining messages, the average reputation-per-message was 0.14. Approximately 75% of the messages were posted while the market was open, the average message was written by an author on 60 different watch lists, approximately 21% of the messages were replies to another message, and the average message length was 230 characters.
Sentiment was coded as -3 for short sell, -2 for strong sell, -1 for sell, 0 for hold, 1 for buy, and 2 for strong buy. For the messages with a sentiment, the average sentiment was 1.19
or slightly buy-side biased. 7 The reputation per post among these messages was approximately 0.067, suggesting that those who offered sentiment were, on average, lower reputation authors. On average, the firm referred to in a message had a book to market value ratio of 0.36, a market capitalization of approximately $3.9 billion, had approximately 36% of outstanding shares held by institutional investors, and had approximately 10% of outstanding shares being sold short. 7 The mean sentiment score is in line with the 1.56 reported by Tumarkin and Whitelaw (2001) based on data from the Ragingbull.com.
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The bottom panel of Table 1 reports the average accuracy of the sentiments relative to intra and inter-day abnormal returns. Approximately 65% of the sentiments offered matched the same day abnormal return, about 42% matched the following day's abnormal return, about 42% matched the second day's abnormal return, and approximately 40% matched the third day's abnormal return. About the same proportion of sentiments matched the abnormal returns between the first and second, first and third, and first and fifth trading days after the message was posted.
Empirical Analysis
The first step in the empirical strategy is to estimate the odds that an author provides a voluntary sentiment for a particular message. To test hypotheses H1a and H1b, a standard probit model of the following form is estimated:
where the dependent variable takes a value of one if a buy-hold-sentiment was offered for message i, 's are vectors of parameters to be estimated, and  is a normally distributed error term. 8 The vector REPUTATION includes the number of watch lists to which the author has been added and either the average reputation points per posted message or the quintile in which the author's reputation falls on the day the message was posted. The vector MESSAGE contains characteristics of the message itself, including whether the message was posted while the market was open, whether the message is a reply to a previous message, and the length of the message in characters. Table 2 lists the anticipated impacts of the explanatory variables on the odds of offering sentiment.
8 A detailed discussion of the probit and ordered probit estimation techniques is provided in Kennedy (2003) .
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As equation (1) is ultimately used to control for sample selection bias in the type of sentiment offered, it is important to include at least one variable in equation (1) that will not appear in subsequent models in which sample selection bias is a concern. Here, message length is included in equation (1) to identify the selection equation, beyond the identification that accompanies the non-linear nature of the estimation. Message length might correlate with offering sentiment but would not be expected to correlate with the type of sentiment offered. Table 3 reports the results of this first stage of the empirical analysis using the entire sample of 48,644 observations; both the estimated probit parameters and the marginal impact of each explanatory variable (holding other variables at their sample means) are reported.
Model (1) have a sentiment associated with them, but a message that is a reply to another message is approximately 6% less likely to have a sentiment associated.
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A formal test of H1a entails a test that the parameters on AVECREDITS and WATCHLISTS are jointly equal to zero (alternatively that the parameters on QUNTILE1-QUINTILE5 and WATCHLISTS are jointly equal to zero). As reported in Table 3 , the null hypothesis H1a is rejected, supporting the idea that author reputation influences the odds of providing sentiment. A formal test of H2a entails a test of whether the parameters on the message characteristics are jointly equal to zero. As reported in Table 3 , the null hypothesis H2a is rejected, supporting the idea that message characteristics can be used to predict when a sentiment is offered.
The results in Model (2) generally support those in Model (1), however in this case we find that those in the second quintile are slightly more likely to offer a sentiment than authors with no reputation but that those authors in the upper fourth and fifth quintiles are approximately 15% less likely to offer a sentiment than authors with no reputation. In Model (2) the parameter estimates associated with message characteristics are similar to those in Model (1).
To test hypotheses H2a and H2b, an ordered probit model of the following form is estimated:
where the dependent variable reflects the level of sentiment, ranked from most bearish (short sell) to most bullish (strong buy), the 's are parameters to be estimated, and v is assumed to be a normally distributed error term. The vector REPUTATION includes the number of watch lists to which the author has been added and either the average reputation points per posted message or the quintile of author's reputation. The vector FIRM contains 18 characteristics of the firm about which the message was written: the firm's market capitalization at the end of the trading day, the book to market ratio, the percentage of the firm's stock sold short, the percentage of the firm's stock owned by institutional investors, and whether the firm's stocks are optioned. Table 2 lists the anticipated impacts of the explanatory variables on the level of sentiment offered.
The results from estimating equation (2) may suffer selection bias given the results of estimating equation (1). However, to date there is no standard approach to estimating an ordered probit model with sample selection in a simultaneous framework. 9 Therefore, to accommodate selection bias as much as practical with the current sample, the inverse Mills ratio was calculated using the results for Model (1) and Model (2) in Table 3 . 10 It is anticipated that if there is substantial selection bias based on author reputation that the greatest impact would be on the parameters on author reputation variables. If the inverse Mills ratio is insignificant, this would suggest no significant selection bias.
The ordered probit results are reported in Table 4 . Model (1) and Model (2) use watch lists and the average credits per message to measure author reputation, with Model (2) including the Inverse Mills Ratio. Model (3) and Model (4) use watch lists and the quintile of 9 The two-step process we implement here runs the risk of introducing bias in the calculation of standard errors because the selection equation and the ordered-probit models are estimated separately. Miranda and RabeHesketh (2005) propose a technique in which selection models and endogenous switching models can be estimated for ordinal and discrete dependent variables. We attempted to implement their methodology but were unable to obtain convergence given the sample size and available computing power. 10 The inverse Mills ratio is defined as XXwhere  is the standard normal density function and  is the cumulative standard normal density function, each evaluated at fitted value from estimating equation (1).
The two-step process we implement requires an exclusion restriction in the first stage (probit) model to fully identify the inverse Mills ratio. In this case, the length of the message is included in the question of whether sentiment is offered but not in the type of sentiment offered. The intuition is that longer messages might correlate with sentiment being offered if the author feels the need to justify their offering sentiment. However, it is not clear why the length of message would more likely correlate with bullish or bearish sentiment, ex ante. Indeed, difference in means tests suggest that there is no statistically significant difference in message length between those observations that offer a non-buy sentiment (hold, sell, strong sell, or sell short) and a buy sentiment (buy or strong buy). Therefore, we utilize the variation in message length to identify the choice to offer sentiment and therefore identify the inverse Mills ratio. the author's total credits to measure author reputation, with Model (4) including the Inverse Mills Ratio. In both Model (2) and model (4) the inverse-Mills ratio has a statistically significant negative parameter, indicating sample selection bias. The discussion of the models reported in Table 4 therefore focus on the two that control for selection bias. Indeed, ignoring the sample selection bias yields opposite conclusions as to the influence of author reputation on sentiment offered.
After controlling for sample selection, the evidence suggests that authors with greater reputation points offer stronger buy-sentiments (those authors with lower reputation score are more likely to offer a strong sell sentiment). When the authors are classified by their relative reputation, the evidence suggests that those authors in the middle quintiles (two, three, and four) are more likely to offer a strong-buy sentiment than authors with zero reputation.
Looking at firm characteristics, the evidence from both Model (2) and Model (4) in Table   4 suggests that firms with greater market capitalization, firms with more stock held by institutional investors, and those firms who have stock options listed tend to have more bearish sentiment. On the other hand, firms with a greater percentage of their existing stock float sold short enjoy more bullish sentiment. There is no statistically meaningful relationship between sentiment and the book to market ratio of the firm.
These results are supported by the following intuition. Firms with smaller market capitalization are more likely to receive buy-side sentiment because online traders are more likely to be attracted to small cap stocks which usually trade at a lower price per share. The greater the percentage of a firm's outstanding shares sold short, the stronger the buy-side sentiment because the higher short ratio implies a greater chance for a stock buy-back, which 20 in turn would cause the stock price to increase. If a firm's shares are optioned, then many traders will switch to option trading instead of trading the stock itself, which could cause a reduction in the stock's price, ceteris paribus, and therefore encourage a sell-side sentiment.
To test hypothesis H2a, a test that the parameters on the variables that comprise the vector REPUTATION are jointly equal to zero is undertaken. The results are reported in However, as pointed out by Wooldridge (2002) , the parameter estimates from an ordered probit model are not directly interpretable and only indicate whether there is an unambiguous increase or decrease in the probability of being in the extreme categories. The marginal impacts of each explanatory variable on the probability that offered sentiment falls in one of the six -bins‖ are reported in Table 5 and Table 6 (holding all other variables at their sample means); Table 5 corresponds to Model (2) in Table 4 and Table 6 corresponds to Model (4) in Table 4 . As average credit per message increases there is an unambiguous increase in the probability that an author recommends a strong buy and a reduced probability that the author would offer any lower sentiment. It is interesting that there is no meaningful impact of the number of watch lists on the type of sentiment offered although it is highly correlated with the odds that any sentiment is offered.
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Thus far the empirical results suggest that reputation has a statistically significant impact on whether a particular message is associated with a voluntarily offered sentiment and that, after controlling for selection bias, authors with higher reputation have a higher probability of offering a buy sentiment while authors with no reputation at stake tend to be more bearish.
One possible explanation for bearish sentiment from those without reputation is that these posters want to attract more attention to earn credits. If the majority of posters are bullish, one way an individual author might differentiate herself is to offer bearish sentiment, that is, to be contrarian in order to garner attention.
This suggests that the reputation system analyzed has a systematic relationship with the propensity to offer a buy-hold-sentiment. However, does the reputation system investigated influence the accuracy of sentiment offered (at least in the short term)? To test whether author reputation correlates with sentiment accuracy, the abnormal return of the stock referenced in each message was calculated for the day the message was posted, and for the following three trading days. Inter-day abnormal returns between the first trading day and the second, third, and the fifth trading day after the message was posted were also calculated. A sentiment is characterized as accurate if the abnormal return was negative and the sentiment was sell, strong-sell, or short, or if the abnormal return was positive and the sentiment was hold, buy, or strong-buy.
To test hypotheses H3a-H3c, probit models of the following general form are estimated:
where the dependent variable takes a value of one if the sentiment was accurate, the 's are parameters to be estimated and w is a normally distributed error term. The vector
22
REPUTATION contains variables related to the author's reputation, the vector MESSAGE contains variables describing the message itself, and the vector FIRM contains variables that describe the firm about which the message was written. Table 2 lists the anticipated impacts of the explanatory variables on the odds of accurate sentiment. Table 7 and Table 8 report the probit estimation results; in this case the reported impacts are actual marginal impacts evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables.
Hypothesis H3a focuses on how author reputation, measured as watch lists and average credits (or reputation quintile), influence sentiment accuracy. To test H3a, the test that the parameters of the variables that comprise REPUTATION are jointly equal to zero is undertaken for each model in Table 7 and Table 8 . Of the eight models reported in Table 7, only Model (4) and Model (8) reject the null hypothesis H3a. From Table 7 , authors who fall in reputation quintiles two and three are slightly more likely to be accurate in their sentiment on the day their message was posted, which might indicate day-trading behavior, however the hypothesis of joint insignificance is not rejected. In contrast, in Model (4) and Model (8) the higher reputation quintiles are negatively related to sentiment accuracy one and three days from when the message was posted, respectively. Only in Model (8) is the number of watch lists positively related to sentiment accuracy, in this case the accuracy of sentiment three days after the message was posted.
There is more evidence that author reputation is related to sentiment accuracy in the inter-day models reported in Table 8 . Of the six models in Table 8 , only Model (1) fails to reject H3a. However, for the remaining models in Table 8 the evidence suggests that author reputation is negatively related to sentiment accuracy.
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Generally speaking there seems to be no systematic relationship between author reputation, measured either absolutely or relatively, and sentiment accuracy. Indeed, if any conclusion is to be drawn from the evidence provided in Table 7 and Table 8 , authors with better reputations are less likely to be accurate in their stated sentiments, even if they are less likely to offer a sentiment.
Testing null hypothesis H3b (H3c) entails a test that the parameters of the variables in vector MESSAGE (FIRM) are jointly equal to zero. For every model in Table 7 and Table 8 , both null hypotheses H3b and H3c are rejected. The evidence suggests that, other than the day on which the message is posted, messages that are posted while the market is open are approximately 2% less likely to be accurate, all else equal. On the other hand, messages that are replies to other messages are sometimes more accurate (such as on the day the message is posted, and the second data after a message is posted) but at other times less accurate (such as on day three after a message is posted and between the first and fifth days after a message is posted).
Considering null hypothesis H3c, sentiments concerning larger firms, firms with greater book to market ratios, with a greater percentage of outstanding shares sold short tend to be less accurate. Sentiments concerning firms with more shares held by institutional investors tend to be more accurate. The evidence is mixed when considering whether a firm's stock has options listed; sentiment is less accurate concerning same-day and three day abnormal returns and inter-day abnormal returns, but slightly more accurate in relation to one-day and two-day abnormal returns.
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Combined the various empirical results suggest that the reputation system used by
Thelion.com has the desired effect of reducing the propensity for authors to offer unsolicited buy-hold-sell sentiment. However, the system does seem to encourage stronger buy sentiment by authors with higher reputations. Unfortunately, there is very little relationship between author reputation and sentiment accuracy, at least after the day the message is posted.
An important question, therefore, is whether the system mitigates adverse selection to the benefit of Thelion.com's users? To the extent that the sentiment offered by authors is not accurate, and to the extent that readers might act on sentiments offered, the fact that the reward system curtails the probability of offering a sentiment provides a weak improvement for the end user -the end user is not exposed to as many noisy signals than they otherwise would be. However, that high-reputation authors are less accurate in their stated sentiment might expose those end-users who act upon incorrect sentiments to more risk.
A final question is how high-reputation authors maintain their status if their sentiments are less likely to be incorrect. It is, of course, impossible for us to know exactly why each end-user offered reputation points to any particular author. However, if authors are more accurate on the day they post their message, they might receive additional reputation scores based solely on their short-run, current-day, accuracy. If the majority of readers are short-run traders (as documented by Hirschey, et al., 2000 , Koski, et al., 2007 , and Zhang and Swanson, 2010 , they would then suffer an information asymmetry in which the readers only recognize the short-run accuracy of author sentiment and would not focus on the medium to long-run accuracy of author sentiment.
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Conclusions
This paper provides an empirical examination of how a reader-generated reputation system influences adverse selection on an Internet message board. Most message boards are inherently plagued by adverse selection because of author anonymity. However, the message board we investigate has a reputation system in which readers can grant pecuniary rewards, in the form of credits, to authors of their choice. We interpret an author's average credits per message as a measure of reputation and test whether reputation influences the frequency and accuracy of voluntarily offered buy-hold-sell sentiments.
We find that authors with no reputation tend to offer sentiment more often and authors with higher reputation offer sentiment less often. This selection process has important implications for testing how reputation influences the type of sentiment offered. When not controlling for selection, we find that higher reputation is correlated with a higher probability of offering a sell-side sentiment. However, after controlling for selection, we obtain the opposite result: not only do authors with greater reputation offer sentiment less often, when they do offer sentiment there is a higher probability that it will be a buy-side sentiment.
We also test whether authors with higher reputations are more accurate in their sentiment, when sentiment is offered. We find some evidence that high-reputation authors are more accurate in predicting same-day abnormal returns but that, in general, reputation has no positive and perhaps a slightly negative relationship with sentiment accuracy. Our results suggest that in a world of -cheap talk‖ even small pecuniary rewards can significantly reduce the temptation to engage in cheap talk but that the talk remains cheap nonetheless. 
